Martin v. Colonna : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Martin v. Colonna : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christian B. Bryner; Jensen Bryner Law Offices, PLLC; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee.
Patricia Abbott; Utah Legal Services, Inc.; Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Martin v. Colonna, No. 20071017 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/625
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TAMRA M. MARTIN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
ANTHONY NEIL COLONNA, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 20071017-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT, TAMRA M. MARTIN 
Appeal from Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Dismissal of Petition for 
Protective Order 
In the Seventh Judicial District Court 
for Carbon County, State of Utah 
Honorable George M. Harmond 
District Court Judge 
Christian B. Bryner, # 8730 
Jensen Bryner Law Offices, PLLC 
Attorney for Respondent/ 
Appellee 
90 W. 100 N., 
Suite 3 
Price, UT 84501 
Patricia Abbott, #9854 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ 
Appellant 
455 N. University Ave., 
Suite #100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
S E P - 5 2008 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TAMRA M. MARTIN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
ANTHONY NEIL COLONNA, 
Respondent and AppelleeL 
CaseNo.20071017-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT, TAMRA M. MARTIN 
Appeal from Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Dismissal of Petition for 
Protective Order 
In the Seventh Judicial District Court 
for Carbon County, State of Utah 
Honorable George M. Harmond 
District Court Judge 
Christian B. Bryner, # 8730 
Jensen Bryner Law Offices, PLLC 
Attorney for Respondent/ 
Appellee 
90 W. 100 N., 
Suite 3 
Price, UT 84501 
Patricia Abbott, #9854 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ 
Appellant 
455 N. University Ave., 
Suite #100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. This Court Should Reverse the Trial Court and Enter a Protective Order 
Because the Parties Were Cohabitants at the Time Petitioner Filed 1 
II. It is Necessary to Good Public Policy for the Court to Consider Abuse 
Committed Against Ms. Martin as a Child 3 
III. In Order to Look at the "Totality of the Circumstances," the Court Must 
Consider Past Conduct of the Parties 4 
CONCLUSION 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 6 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, 414 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 18 P.3d 1129 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001) passim 
Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) 4 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-102 (3) (2008) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-103 (1) (2008) 2, 5 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TAMRA M. MARTIN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
ANTHONY NEIL COLONNA, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 20071017-CA 
Priority No. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT AND ENTER 
A PROTECTIVE ORDER BECAUSE THE PARTIES WERE 
COHABITANTS AT THE TIME PETITIONER FILED. 
In his response, the Respondent concedes that the trial court erred in finding that 
the parties are not currently cohabitants. The Respondent seems to assert that the trial 
court's finding that the parties were not cohabitcints is harmless error. Petitioner disagrees 
that finding that the parties are not currently cohabitants is harmless error: the Petitioner 
had standing to file a protective order against her father; the trial court made a finding 
that she had been abused; and the trial court should have entered the protective order on 
those bases. Therefore, the Petitioner requests that this Court reverse the trial court and 
enter a permanent protective order. 
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Respondent seems to state that the finding that the parties are not currently 
cohabitants is harmless error. He states that the trial court correctly dismissed the request 
for protective order because much of the abuse took place while Ms. Martin was a minor 
child living with the Respondent. He alleges that abuse to a child living with a parent 
does not qualify a Petitioner for a protective order because a minor child is statutorily 
exempted from the legislative definition of "cohabitant" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-7-102 (3) (2008), and, pursuant to footnote 8 of Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 
1165 (Utah 2002), only abuse occurring while the parties were cohabitants should be 
considered. 
This interpretation is contradicted by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
7-103 (2008), which states: 
(1) Any cohabitant who has been subjected to abuse or domestic violence, 
or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of abuse or domestic violence, 
may seek an ex parte protective order or a protective order in accordance 
with this chapter . . . 
The statute requires only a finding that the parties are cohabitants at the time of 
filing to grant standing in a protective order action. There is no statutory requirement that 
the parties must have been cohabitants at all times when domestic violence occurred in 
order for the domestic violence to be a basis for issuance of a protective order. 
This case is markedly different from the circumstances to which the Court referrec 
in footnote 8 of the Bailey decision. In that case, the court considered whether abuse or 
domestic violence occurred while the Bailey parties were cohabitants. The Bailey parties 
were both adults divorcing after a long marriage. A protective order filed by an adult 
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child against a parent is very different. Children are statutorily exempted from filing for a 
protective order against a parent while they are minors. In every other respect, a child is 
clearly a "cohabitant" of a parent with whom he or she resides. Ms. Martin resided in the 
same household with her father until her parents separated and divorced. The Court found 
that Mr. Colonna physically abused Ms. Martin while she was living with him. (Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Dism. of Pet. for Protective Order at 1). 
II. IT IS NECESSARY TO GOOD PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE COURT TO 
CONSIDER ABUSE COMMITTED AGAINST MS- MARTIN AS A CHILD. 
It would be against public policy to bar Ms. Martin from seeking a protective 
order based on childhood abuse because the abuse occurred before she qualified as a 
cohabitant. The legislature did not grant a child standing to file for an adult protective 
order because the legislature provided that a child may be protected against an abuser if 
someone files a child protective order on his or her behalf in juvenile court. A child may 
not file his or her own child protective order in juvenile court, and despite many instances 
of serious abuse, no one filed to protect Ms. Martin against her father while she was a 
child. At age nineteen, Ms. Martin sought protection from the courts. Prior to age 
eighteen, Ms. Martin had neither standing to file a child protective order for herself nor 
standing to file an adult protective order. To bar Ms. Martin from relying on childhood 
abuse as a basis for entry of an adult protective order would also violate Ms. Martin's 
rights to equal protection under the laws. It would place her in danger by barring the 
court from considering serious abuse occurring prior to her majority. 
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IN ORDER TO LOOK AT THE "TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES," THE COURT MUST CONSIDER PAST CONDUCT 
OF THE PARTIES. 
In his re sponse brief, the R e s p o n d e n t c i tes this i ••.: I'S approval o f l a n g u a g e i n in 
B o m e k v. B o n i e k , I T f I V1 "J VHi Vnf \ Mii .n < f \ p | I'W<>i in s u p p o r t the proposi t ion 
that the trial court must weigh the evidence in the "totality of the circumstances" to 
determine whether entry of a protective order is warranted. Id, 
circumstances also involves looking at past abuse. The Boniek decision states, "Past 
abusive behavior, although not dispositive, is a factor in determining cause for 
pioicuioii/' Id. 
The trial court made a finding that "Petitioner was physically struck by the 
respondent while her parents were married and residing together." (Findings of Fact, 
C o n c l u s i o n s ot 1 aw ami D I M \ '( IVI << i P ' o i i v l a • ' H 'i i i1 ' ' ' is u 1 \n *MI I "< • ll1 c 
court to properly analyze the Petitioner's case without considering abuse to her as a 
minor child. 
I he Respondent argues that tl le ti ial :oi n t's fit idii lgs w ei e sufficiei itl> detailed t :> 
allow the court to find that given the "totality of the circumstances," there was not a 
substantial likelihood of imminent danger to the Petitioner. (Response Brief at 5). The 
Petitioner disagrees uiai um • uirt need i i lake a findii lg tl ial; tl le I *etitioi lei n mst be in 
in in ! linent dai lgei ' I lie Bailey case provides that ". . . a petitioner may alternatively seek a 
protective order if he or she has been 'subjected to abuse or domestic violence.'" 52 P.3d 
o f n
^ ' ii -: temphasis in original). 
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Petitioner submits that the trial court's findings were sufficient to conclude that 
she had been subjected to abuse or domestic violence. Petitioner also submitted evidence 
to the trial court that the Respondent had recently threatened her life over the phone, 
which shows a substantial likelihood of imminent danger to the Petitioner. The trial court 
made no findings as to whether the threat occurred, finding only that the phone call 
occurred, and that the Respondent was "angry."' (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Dism. of Pet. for Protective Order at 1). In the alternative, if this Court determines 
that the past abuse to the Petitioner is not enough of itself to grant the protective order, 
this court should remand the case to the trial court, directing the court to make a finding 
on the material point of whether the Respondent told the Petitioner that he "wished [she] 
weren't alive, and that [she] was never born, and that he could take care of that for [her]," 
as she alleges. (R. at 47). 
Conclusion 
The Petitioner/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find that as a 
cohabitant of the Respondent and a victim of past abuse, she is entitled to the entry of a 
protective order, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-103(1) (2008). In the alternative, 
she requests that this Court reverse the decision and remand it to the trial court to make 
additional findings as necessary. 
DATED, this 5 t h day of gfpjembef , 2008. 
Otitic 
Patricia K. Abbott 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
5 
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